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ic artl« >ng I
Does not dec- ; . jog
New or ii*jver said "before - -
Oar Governffiec\. iit on a sensitive strut ;f cheeks-an-.
balances. Its keystone—the Constitution—cleverly divides permissive and
restrictive powers, and distributes these to the three branches of Govern-
ment. The framers of this remarkable document knew too well the dangers of
unbridled authority; they had waged a revolution against it. Dearly had
they bought their opportunity to build a new nation.
One would not expect such a system to function in complete harmony.
As expected, since human attitudes, opinions, drives, and actions are in-
volved, conflicts often arise. When they occur, they may be resolved by
compromise, consent, use of authority, use of power, or by other means. The
action taken on conflicts depends on the point in the government process
that the conflict takes place, the issues involved, and the individual re-
sponsible and empowered to exert authority.
One of the most elusive and difficult points to remember about the
2
nature of conflicts is that they always occur between individuals. A branch
Budyard Kipling, "General Summary," Radyard Kipling, Vol. Ill,
(n.p., n.n., n.d.), p. 3&5«
A. Lawrence Lowell, Conflicts of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1956) » P» 13
•
..
2of government cannot, of itself, be in conflict vita anything* Always an
issue can be reduced to a conflict of attitudes, ideas, opinions and desires
between responsible individuals. Organizations are nothing more than people
working in a structured relationship. Ideas, attitudes, opinions and desires
3
do not exist except in the minds of men.
Approaching any study from the conflict viewpoint requires a delicacy
that often loses its flavor when placed on the written page. One feels freer
to criticize organizations than to criticize people, unless the people are no
longer living. Because of this difficulty this paper often lapses into the
never-never land where branches of government seem to have brains, military
organizations seem to have attitudes, and departments speak. Rest assured
that this is not true. This is a tale of conflict; the participants are not
organizations, but dedicated men, acting within organizational structures.
It is my purpose to explore these conflicts, starting with the nature
of all conflicts and working toward an understanding of the development of
current conflicts of immediate importance to the military man.
But take caution, conflicts are not of themselves evidence of a
k
faulty system. Nor do they constitute evidence of a hopeless deadlock. For
every conflict there are agreements. We would not expect dedicated men with
differing duties and experiences always to be of one mind while operating
within a government framework consisting of divided powers.
This is an examination of the origin and nature of conflicts. It is
a study of those which are of greatest impact today. It is an attempt to
help the reader understand the issues and dangers involved. With this under-
standing, the issues in conflict, as well as the personal interests of the
participants, can be recognized.
Wu«. Eraeat HOckiag, Preface to thiloswto, te*t*x* (•* York:
She Mftcmillan Company, 1S&7), P* EST
Jewell, loc. cit.

3This age of conflict calls for wisdom, patience, and understanding.
There is a time for circumventing and a time for facing conflicts which can-
not he circumvented. In either case, this paper will assist the reader in
understanding and resolving his own conflicts.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS
Introduction
5
Conflict is deiined as a strife for mastery, a clash or a divergence.
We shall be concerned with the divergence of opinions and attitudes of indi-
viduals and their overt manifestations in a clash or strife for mastery some-
where in the government process.
Conflicts Involve Attitudes and Opinions
An old proverb states that "it takes two to make an argument." Even
the most happily married man would not disagree, but "two' of what* Essen-
tially it takes two people, each with his own attitude toward a certain
thing, and these two attitudes seem irreconcilable. Argument is an overt
expression of conflict of attitudes and should have some purpose, which may
be:
1. To communicate the attitude* In Government this might be known as
"stating a position."
2. To persuade the other person. Again this may take the form of ex-
panding or elaborating on one's stated position to show that it is "right."
3. To persuade authority or public opinion. This purpose is quite
evident during an election year.
5






Organizations are people. A disciplined organization may appear to
bave a mind of its own, "but this is not true. It may appear to be so because
the customs, traditions, rules, and directives adopted by or imposed upon the
members create an atmosphere of unity. Individually the members may have
different viewpoints, but they act in a disciplined manner for many reasons:
1. They have confidence in their superior and themselves.
2. They desire to avoid personal responsibility for acting
otherwise.
3. They fear sanctions that may be imposed by superiors or
the law.
k. They believe in the ultimate objectives even if they may
disagree with methods.
The reader should view this from the opposite point of view also.
If a superior-subordinate conflict should arise, such as certain examples
that will be described,within the executive branch, nou-conformity, or in-
subordinate action, could result from:
1. Lack of confidence in the superior
2. Lack of self-confidence
3. Willingness to assume responsibility for non-conformist actions
4. Disregard of sanctions or law
5. Inability to align personal beliefs with the objectives or methods
required.
Conflicts Involve Values, Ethics and Ls*r
If one accepts the premise that most men are dedicated to certain
principles, basics ly honest, law abiding ind forthright, then this premise
7Ibid .
Richard N. Qwm&, Introduction to Business Policy (Homewood, 111.:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 195*0 > PP« 1C4-106.
Q
'Lowell, op. cit .j chaps, i, vii, xi.

should apply doubly for government servants. The human element of conflict
in Government springs from the fact that men have different conceptions of
what is "right," "wrong," "good for the nation," "top priority," "legal,"
"democratic," or "communistic." Not only can individuals conflict in their
opinions with each other, but also a great deal of self-conflict can arise
when the government servant is faced with deciding whether he should take the
only course which he considers "right" and "for the good of the Nation," when
he also believes it to be "unethical."
Our Constitution, born out of a violent period, left a good deal of
room for conflict, short of bloodshed, in government processes. The framers
of the Constitution realized that men will always hold different values,
loyalties, and judgments. Understanding this, they wisely separated powers
so that the attempt of any one individual to impose his values on the country
could be checked to some degree. So we were given law, born out of conflict,
recognizing the value of agreement. But the law also assures that if there
is disagreement between the branches of government, such disagreement may be
heard and, if strong enough, check the intentions of the other branch, within
the law.
Conflicts Involve Uncertainty
Not only are values important, but the relative importance of one
value^ over another, or one government program over another, is constantly
being weighed. If the President, Congress and the military possessed all the
facts on an issue, could portend the future, and had the wisdom of Solomon,
they might never disagree. Neither the present nor the future is seen in the
same light by men, nor do men possess infinite wisdom. Nevertheless, they are
A. Craig Baird, General Speech (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
19^9) > chap. x.

constantly required to make decisions involving the future of the country
with a minimum of information at hand. As an example, consider military ex-
penditures. Approximately fifty-seven percent of government spending is for
national defense. How can the wisdom of this huge amount be judged? Mot even
hindsight can tell us what would have happened if the money had not been
spent. Nor do we have complete information to enable us to choose between
alternate programs today. Our Tfetion's future rests in the hands of men who
have the courage to make decisions in the face of uncertainty.
12
Conflicts Involve Loyalties
In a superior-subordinate relationship, such as we find in Government
and in the military service, loyalties are pretty well defined by law and
custom in the lower echelons. However, as the Government pyramid gets closer
to the people (Washington), loyalties become somewhat confused in the minds
of responsible individuals. Consider the head of a military department, com-
missioned to obey the orders of the President. He has been trained to give
unswerving loyalty to his superiors. He has sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution. He has also been trained to speak his opinion until a decision
has been reached, at which time he should diligently carry out his orders
13
without regard to his opinion. He has also been trained that loyalty is a
Ik
two-way proposition extending from superior to subordinate and vice versa.
Place this military officer in a congressional hearing regarding
appropriations or the Defense Department reorganization. Where does his loy-
alty lie? In the hearing, decisions regarding his future and the future of
^filliam A. Reitzel, "Decision Makings—A Primary Executive Responsi-
bility," lecture before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washing-
ton, D. C, September 28, 1959.
12
Lowell, op. cit ., chap. xii.
^Department of the Army Field Manual FM 101-5 > Staff Organization
and Procedure (Washington, D. C, U. ^. Government Printing Office, 1950),
chap. i.
14
Army General School Special Text Wo. 1, Leadership for the Company
Officer (Fort Riley, Kansas, n.n., 1950), chap. i.

8his department will "be made "by Congress which has the constitutional authority
to raise and support the Army and Navy, as well as to puhlish regulations
15
governing them. The military man is placed in the conflicting situation in
which he may "be accused of insubordination by his superior if he does not sup-
port the President's program. At the same time his superior does not have
17
the power of decision. Within the law, the secretary of a military depart-
ment or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may bring matters before
Congress. This has been dubbed "legal insubordination" by the executive
19hrandp. Is it a good definition? Even the words are in conflict!
Conflicts Involve Communications
A conflict of opinions comes to nothing if it remains in the mind of
the dissenter. Modern communication techniques can quickly widen the scope
of a government conflict and make it"the business of the people." Depending
on the use of communications, the conflict may either stay within normal
bounds or assume nationwide significance and importance. Military men, such
as "Billy"Mitchell and General MacArthur, chose to throw their conflicts on
the world sounding board. They met with more drastic discipline within the
executive branch than that meted out to those who are merely "legally insub-
ordinate." They chose to circumvent the customary communications chain.
Conflicts Involve Time and Space
An old military "stock answer" used in responding to academic tacti-
cal questions is: "That depends on the situation and the terrain." Useful
15
U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8.
"Defense Organization," Armed Forces Management, HOvember, 1959,
P. 25.
17
U. S. Constitution, loc. cit .
18
U. S. National Security Act of 19^7» as amended (50 U.S.C. tol),
sec. 202.
19
Armed Forces Management, loc. cit.

9as an answer, It does not solve problems* The military man who waits for a
complete picture of the situation and the terrain will wait until he is
defeated.
Like other government officials, the military man must make decisions,
viewing the situation and the terrain through a misty window. His hope is
that his decisions, forcefully carried out, will he the best to meet a chang-
ing situation and place him in an advantageous position for future goals.
Situations constantly change. An answer for the problems of today may
be completely useless for similar future problems as time changes perspec-
tives. The situation may change slowly or abruptly. Generals Lee and Grant
at .Appomattox would have used, one day before the surrender, whatever means
each had to destroy the other. Once the retreat of Lee's army was blocked,




Conflicts Barely Involve Absolutes
Men do not argue over black and white. Conflicts occur in the gray
regions where one man sees more black and the other more white. Coupling this
concept with the influences of time and space, one can see that he who holds
to a principle which solved a problem five years ago may meet head-on with
one who holds to a contradictory principle suitable for five years hence.
Which one is right for today?
Compare this to the problem of budgeting for military weapons. Is it
any wonder that there should be disagreement over which weapons should receive
prime consideration? Who can say what is right for today or the future?
Nevertheless, the decision must be made, in changing times, in the face of
uncertainty.
20






Conflicts Involve Principles With Limits
A favorite technique of Joke writers is to take a principle held to
te good and "stretch" it to absurdity* Thus 'cooperation" could reach the
extreme of "two Chinamen doing each others laundry/' Changing times often
cause orthodox government decisions to reach ridiculous extremes. A govern-
ment department or military organisation, built on limited; inflexible prin-
ciples^ can become expensive and unnecessary as time stretches these limits*
temperance, legally installed beyond its limits, as prohibition, became a
governmental liability* We believe in free competition, but ve apply anti-
trust limitations on those who become too "successful" at freely competing
when they restrict the freedom of others. Personal liberty is limited by
certain police powers.
The application of limited principles can be seen in fiscal policy
where the limited principle of budget fofrl i*mft?Tig has given way to the limited
23
principle of proximate balance. The limits of this principle seem to have
been exceeded also as deficit spending continues in good times and bad.
Problems faced in choosing a proper Defense Department organisation
and the management of new weapons systems also indicate that time, technology,
and space have snapped the limits of old principles, and new ones must take
2k
their place*
Conflicts Involve Conceptual Skills
Hot only do principles have limits, but individual ainds~-shaped by
25
education and experience view oroblems in a different frame of reference.
' If
Ibid*
'^John A. Beckett, "She Processes and Critical Issues of the Federal




Armed Forces Management* loc. eit .
Lowell, op. eit ., chap. xiii.
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Hot only are men limited "by Incomplete information, but the information tbey
do have is colored by their viewpoint. Individual minds are limited in their
ability to understand given information. Thoughts lose their cogency because
of the problems of semantics in communication.
In the governmental processes, differing conceptions of the same
problem create seme of the hottest conflicts.
Consider a piece of legislation. The President sees it as good be-
cause it is "good for the nation." The congressman sees it as "had" because
it will throw 10,000 voters from his district out of work. The Supreme Court
views it as had because it is "illegal." Each branch views a different facet
and pronounces judgment.
For men to be of accord, a common conception of a problem requires a
great deal of commnnl cation and instruction. History is replete with ex-
amples of failures of projects due to the incomplete concept of a particular
problem. If General Stuart had shared General Lee's conceptions, Gettysburg
27
might not have been a Southern defeat. ' If General Jackson had told his
generals his future plans at Chancellorsville, the Union defeat there might
have been complete.
A need for better conceptual skills exists in Government today. This
is especially true in the Department of Defense. Rapid evolutions and tech-
nological advances bring on conflicts, many of which could be solved by
broader knowledge. Organization structures and control measures can hinder
or assist in the development of conception.
So-called "inter-service rivalries" are caused by differences in con-
ceptual skills. This can be attributed simply to a difference in
26
Joseph Peleg, ''Controller Communications with Top Management,"
The Controller, April, 1959, p. 159.
27
'Fletcher Pratt, Ordeal by Fire (New York: William Sloane Associates,
Inc., 19*18), p. 216.




occupations. But there is a danger to the country if one conception should
reign supreme. !Zhe defeat of the Spanish Armada chows that a splendidly
equipped army cannot win a naval battle. One charge of "parochialism" that
the President has recently hurled at certain military men indicates that he
regards their conception as limited and narrow. Although the issue over which
the charge arose will not he judged, an important point to remember is that
specialized study may increase knowledge; but it may not increase wisdom,
mental balance and the ability to find the right limit between conflicting
30
opinions.
There is always danger of misconception when one fails to completely
investigate and understand the opinions of others before he passes Judgment
on them, or before he "takes a stand" on a certain problem. Politicians can
afford themselves the luxury of fighting things they do not understand. She
military departments should not make that mistake. History has shown that
each needs the other more than the nation needs any one in its present form*
World War XI was won by each Service providing support for the other and the
understanding of common problems by men of conception. Shis should not be
forgotten in times of peace.
Conclusion
Our Government was formed with the knowledge that conflicts always
will arise but that they should not go uncontrolled. One cannot moralize or
say that conflicts are in themselves good or bad. Evolution may bring on con*
flicts or conflicts may bring on evolution. As long as men differ in exper-
ience, heredity, environment, association, reasoning ability, and education,
they can be expected to have differing conceptions of any problem. Further,
they may conflict on equal terms or on superior-subordinate terms. Conflicts




came about by change when old principles no longer fit a new situation.
Olhere is a need for conflict as well as a lack of conflict. Conflicts may-
bring about change more rapidly and yet the widening of the scope of a con-
flict outside the bounds of custom or law may hurt national prestige. FOr
this reason, men with broad conceptual knowledge are necessary in Government.
Although specialization is required, a specialist can be dangerous if he can-
not conceive a total problem. Communication and an attempt at understanding
can eliminate or make unnecessary many government conflicts.

CHAPTER III
THE AREHA OP COSFLICT
Introduction
Our Nation might be compared to a many-ringed circus with its people
as both the performers and the audience. The rings overlap. The controlling
ring is the Government containing the ringmaster and two equally large rings
each of which checks the other. Hot only do the rings overlap, but they con-
tain smaller rings. The people Jump from one ring to another, try to expand
the ring they happen to be in, and jump in and out of the Government ring.
The show is confusing, viewed as a whole, but the performers own the show and
would not have it otherwise. Since they can see only a few rings at a time
they are usually most concerned with those surrounding them. Bearing in mind
the nature of conflicts, let us see if we can view some of these conflicts as
they involve the Illation—the large arena—and specifically the Government
which is the controlling ring.
The People
The people individually are fine folks, like you and I. But they,
like we, are in conflict within themselves and with other people and groups.
They feel that Government should place more restrictions on others, but allow
31
them more freedom. Individually, they find that they can do little about
freeing themselves and imposing their wills on the Government and others.
* Elmer B. Staats, "The Government Sector of the American Economy,"




There are representatives in Congress, however, who have a greater
degree of power, so the people join pressure groups and political parties to
exert influence on their representatives. To a certain degree their represen-
tative will respond to the will of the people.
The Government influences the people to a great degree. Its many
forces influence the: national economy, standard of living, health, educa-
tional level, transportation, communication, and income of the citizen. The
complete effect of government on the people is hard to measure and difficult
to comprehend. That the people sometimes fail to grasp the significance of
the complete interaction of government is understandable. That they should
not be interested is inexcusable. Those who are not interested in government
are not interested in themselves.
Public Opinion32
A slogan of the middle ages was, "vox populi, vox Dei ," (The voice of
the people [is] the voice of God). Public opinion has been misconstrued many
times. Just as an organization is not a living thing with a mind of its own,
neither is a "public" a living thing. A public consists of people; public
opinion, in its broadest aspect, means that the majority asserts, and the
minority ungrudgingly accepts, opinion toward a certain subject.
There is a real power in public opinion. It gives sanction to or
drops support of laws, such as it did with prohibition. It sustains social
agencies and institutions such as organizations, churches, and schools. It
upholds social and moral standards and it vitalizes public morale.
Public opinion can override conflicts, for any program or attitude is
valueless without public support. The mere existence of a known opinion can
prevent, strengthen, or quicxly quell a governmental conflict. For this
"^^enjamin H. Williams, The Economics of National Security, Vol. Ill,
Public Support, Morale, Security (Washington, D. C: Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, 195&V*
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reason, those who wish to make their conflicts a public issue make a habit of
doing so with their "ear to the ground." Oiey also attempt to educate the
public by widely broadcasting their viewpoints.
Public opinion, though often hasty, is overwhelming in its immediacy.
Since it is informal in nature, it reaches beyond written laws in influencing
behavior and affecting personal opinion; therefore its influence is greater
than law, which must wait for debate and action. It is less mechanical than
law and adjusts itself to all situations. While law hesitates to strike at
motives, public opinion is quick to pass judgment on individual motives. It
can be seen, then, that public opinion is perhaps the greatest controlling
element in public conflict situations.
33
Pressure Groups
A pressure group is a minority public that acts through lobbying or
propaganda to force or defeat legislation or alter public opinion. This is
done by concerted pressure upon legislatures and public opinion. Different
pressure groups often have different motives, but each is certain that its
claims are made in the "public interest."
The success of pressure groups depends to a large degree on the
publicfe or legislature's acceptance of their representation. Recent lampoon-
ing of the resolutions adopted by the Daughters of the American Revolution
[DAR] would indicate that their pressure is not blowing any "pop-valves ,,
either in Congress or on the street.
Bae effect of pressure groups on the public depends on the acceptance
by the public. 2he effect on Congress depends to a large degree on whether
the Congressman believes that the objectives of pressure groups represent





Congress is the great pulse of public opinion. Lord Bryce claimed
that in America the most valuable index to public opinion is the popular
election. This is rather vague because one man may stand for many things,
but Congressmen are certainly interested in public opinion as expressed by
the press, radio, television, and public opinion polls.
It is in Congress that the conflicts of the people begin to affect
national Government. Consider the following:
1. She people want more government benefits and fewer taxes. Although
current fiscal theories of proximate balance hold that a period of prosperity
should occasion an excess of revenue over government spending, deficit spend-
ing is the rule of the day. Congress spends for the people and delays the
35payment.
2. Legislation currently is directed on lines favoring the four major
groups with great political power: business, labor, agriculture, and
veterans. The group representing the aged may even overshadow the veterans
as years of peace accumulate.
Congressmen must carry within themselves the conflicting desires of
the people they represent. As they gain experience these conflicts become
more vivid. They learn that local interests are often in contradiction with
37
the national welfare. A Congressman who is faced with deciding for or
against *n issue that will benefit his constituents to the detriment of the
Bation has a weighty decision to make.
3 " Ibid .
35
•"Staats, loc. clt .
Ernest S. Griffith, Congress: Its Contemporary &>le (Uev York:
New York University Press, 1956), p. 124.
37Congressman William Bates, lecture before the iiavy Graduate Comp-




TO simplify the Congressman's interests, they might be categorized
as:
1. Keeping his job
2. Serving his constituents
3« Serving his country.
The conflicting nature of these interests would lead one to wonder
how any one man could serve over one term and preserve his sanity. Further-
more, one would query how any man with self-esteem could perform all three
and still sleep at night. Surprisingly enough, the great men who have served
a significant portion of their lives on the 'Hill" have learned to "play the
political game" and earn the respect of the public as well. They have learn-
ed early to see the two sides of every conflict, to accept conflicting prin-
ciples as they exist, and to engage in conflicts with spirit and a philo-
sophical attitude, protecting those values which they consider most important.
The President
If the Congressman's conscience bothers him, when he places local
interests before those which he considers best for the Nation, he can reassure
himself with the thought that the founding fathers recognized the need for
someone to represent local interests and hecce established Congress. Although
Congress, as a whole, represents the Nation, the individual Congressman
represents only a segment. The President is the one man on whom the praise
and blame for national accomplishments can be placed. As such, he must re-
solve the conflicting interests, of the people into policy within the law.
His powers have expanded with the tremendous growth of government activities,
the need for direction and leadership in policy and legislation, and the
38
quick successions of national crises.
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Frederick A. Ogg and P. Norman Bay, American Government (Hew York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 19^8), chap. xxi.

19
Hot only does the President have broad powers, "but he has certain
limitations which often bring him into direct conflict with Congress.
Legislative-Executive Conflict
Congress and the President are in agreement on urgent issues, or
39
those which command common loyalty. On other matters, conflicts are cen-
tered around differences of opinion and attempts of one branch to trespass on
the other's authority. Each branch has its own responsibility over which it
maintains jealous surveillance. On occasion one will use its authority to
limit or thwart the intentions of the other.
Ihe most obvious Presidential powers are the veto and power of appoint-
ment. On certain occasions Congress, peculiarly, can use the President's veto
to win votes at home by voting for measures they are certain the President
will veto.
She President can exercise patronage or black-listing both on a per-
sonal or geographic scale. Geographic patronage can affect the military when
military construction is used "oy the executive branch to secure support of or
opposition to certain measures.
Congress has the power of the purse. " Hie President can accomplish
little without financing. Congress can use this power particularly well by
specifically itemizing, restricting, and limiting the amounts and manner in
which appropriations can be spent. The President cannot exercise an item veto
on these bills, and Congress, realizing this, passes appropriation biHs in
such form and at such a late date that complete veto is highly unlikely.
39









While Congress can limit the President's financing, the President
has the power to leave unused, or control by apportionment or expenditure,
funds which Congress may desire to be spent. The President, or executive
agencies, if they feel that funds are entirely insufficient, may spend the
entire amount prematurely and request additional funds* On one occasion, the
Post Office Department did just this and Congress was forced to grant addi-
tional funds. Although Congress' wrath was loud and long, it was impotent
against the tide of public opinion that would ensue should mail stand un-
i+3
delivered.
Thus, almost every check or balance of one branch has an appropriate
counter that can be exercised by the other. Unlike other forms of govern-
ment, such as the Cabinet system, a Presidency can result in lingering con-
kk
flicts between branches.
One weapon of the President that Congress can do little about is the
fact that the President is the President . The power of his prestige is
enormous. The executive branch has also a vast accumulation of facts and
experience to draw on.
Congress can investigate as well as appropriate. These powers fre-
quently involve what has become known as the fourth branch of Government
—the bureaucracy. The power of the purse or the threat of a congressional
investigation can significantly alter the actions of a bureau. Congressional
oversight of government operations can result in punitive or commendable
results. On occasions, the executive branch has refused to honor requests fcr
information by Congress, claiming executive privilege. Once, in the McGrain
45
v * Iteushsrty case, the Supreme Court declared that Congress did have the
^Griffith, loc. cit.




Ogg and Bay, loc. cit
'Griffith, op. cit ., p. 32.
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right to such information, not available elsewhere, in the aid of the legis-
lative function. Although Congress may have the authority to request infor-
mation, there would he little likelihood that the refusal to disclose informa-
tion, if ordered by the President, would result in a contempt conviction
because:
1. The executive department would be required to prosecute a member
of the executive branch who was acting under Presidential order.
2» The President could pardon in advance. She only recourse in such a
case might be for the Senate to order that a person be held. Wisely enough,
neither branch has pushed such matters beyond the oratory stage.
Although these bureaus are often administered by the executive branch,
the appointment of the bureau chief has been confirmed by Congress. Further-
more, the power of the purse and the investigative powers of Congress may
exert considerable pressure on bureau members who wish to keep their jobs.
Such devices as placing time limits on the life of agencies, or requiring
certain action to be reviewed by congressional committees before approval,
create a real conflict of loyalty on the part of department heads. So we
find that not only do both branches block each other, but clever circumven-
tions exist and have been used.
The Bureau of the Budget
The Bureau of the Budget came into being in 1921 under the Budget and
Accounting Act. In 1939 it was moved to the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent. Acting in the "shadow of the President," it speaks for him on matters
concerning the budget. It reviews agency requirements and prepares the
Presidential budget for his approval. It exercises control over budget
k6
Fritz Msrstein Marx, "The Bureau of the Budget; Its Evolution and




execution, determines apportionments, analyzes proposed legislation, and
stimulates management and organization :Lm>rovefflents. Over the years, the
Bureau truly has become powerful in financial management, clearing of legis-
lation, and Government organization matters*
The conflicts vhich center around the Bureau of the Budget are con-
cerned with the duty of the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, as the
budget advisor to the President, for formulating a budget within the frame*
work of the national fiscal policy and the goals of the administration* If
the President calls for a balanced budget, then the budget must approximate
the Secretary of the Treasury*s estimate of receipts. When the budget esti-
mate must be cut to correspond w*ith the receipts, the screaming begins. When
a cut involves the military, resentment is felt by those who feel the Budget
Director is not qualified to "direct military policy." Congress becomes in-
censed when the Budget Director impounds or does not apportion funds to sup-
port favorite projects. The specific overtones of these conflicts will be
explored later.
The Department of Defense
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown in size and power
since its organization in 19^7- Secretary James V. Forrestal, the first
Secretary of Defense, believed that the Secretary should coordinate rather
than administer the military establishments . His reasoning was as follows:
1. Even one single service is so complex and vast that its
Cossaander is hard pressed to direct it.
2. An "administering' Secretary of Defense would become
swamped in detail*
3 • The civilian head of a military service has more authority
and responsibility than he can efficiently handle.*7
k7





Forrestal felt that the Secretary of Defense should coordinate:
(a) finance, (b) recruiting, (e) assignment of missions to the Services,
(d) assignment of the Services primary responsibility for certain weapons,
(e) composition of forces, and (f) resolution of disputes over command
assignments.
Reorganization Plan HO. 6 of 19.^3* and the 1958 Reorganization Act,
have taken the Secretary of Defense out of the "business of coordinating and
made him an administrator, for better or for worse. Placed upon him now are
the duties of operational management and administration over the entire
Department. The only restrictions on his powers are:
1. He cannot merge the military departments.
2. The change of statutory functions are subject to the review of
Congress, excepting the development and use of new weapons
systems, and common supply and Service activities.
3. He shall not have a single Chief of Staff, an over-aJl Armed
Forces Chief of Staff, or any other military staff other than
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. The secretaries of the military departments and the members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff may present to Congress any recommen-
dation they deem proper.^
The gradual centralization of power, of course, has met with some
resistance and conflict. The nature of the conflicts centers around loyalty,
opinions of what constitutes a proper organization, the personalities in*
volved, the present international uncertainties, ccamainications, and conceptual
skills.
Conclusion
The military officer is part and parcel of these arenas. First, he
is a citizen. He, too, must pay taxes; and he, too, complains with the other
citizens of this burden. He, too, wants more from Government in the form of
Armed Forces Management, loc. cit .
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pay, coaaiissaries, exchanges, social security, retirement, medical care, and
other benefits. He forms a part of a publics—the military public—and his
voice is heard with the other citizens when the people speak. He may belong
to veterans' organizations, the Bational Rifle Association, or other groups
which pressure for special consideration. He is paid by congressional appro-
priations bills and Congress writes the laws governing the Secretary of
Defense and his military departments. Since the President is his Commander-in-
Chief, he may find that feelings of mixed loyalty influence his attitude toward
the President, other executive agencies and Congress. As a member of a
military establishment, he may feel that the status of his Service is being
over-controlled by the Secretary of Defense, creating another internal con-
flict. Baese are real problems; these are immediate problems. !Eheir discus-
sion is the subject of the next chapters.

CHAPTER IV
THE OHSAHIZATIOW AHD MANAGEMENT CONFLICT
Introduction
The Government is the most important single factor affecting the
national economy. This has been occasioned "by the demand of people for ex-
panding government activities. The Government operates trust funds; employs
one out of every six employed persons (including military); makes grants,
loans, guarantees, and directs payments; provides goods and services; pro-
tects the consumer; and taxes the citizen. The military spends about half
of the budget yearly.
Forty billion dollars is an amount nearly impossible to comprehend.
To the businessman an organization with an annual spending budget of that
amount is equally difficult to fathom. The Department of Defense yearly
spends an amount equal to the total sales of 12 of the Nation's largest
corporations
.
In contrast to the pre-World War II era, the mechanization of war has
grown by leaps and bounds. During World War II, and in such limited situa-
tions as the Korean Campaign, it was possible, by delaying tactics, to trade
space for times—time to prepare; time to build; time to re-equip; time even
to develop, produce, and distribute the needed weapons, while training the
men to use them. The current situation accepts the premise that there may






our potential enemy, time has "become much more precious. The current think-
ing holds that even time in the development stage cannot be wasted. The
missile-space race places a premium on the shortest possible time lag between
drawing board and issue of the newest weapons, requiring organization and
precise control to accomplish.
But a conflict immediately appears. With 57$ of the tax dollar going
to defense, such a system must save money, The basic complaint of some
Congressmen is the duplication of missile systems, the duplication of support
facilities, the duplication of air fields and functions between the separate
Services. In many respects it will be shown that some of these goals—time
versus expense—reach toward opposite objectives. Several solutions to the
organization conflict have been suggested. Before exploring them we should
look at our present defense organization.
Organization for Defense
The Hoover Commission Reports blamed the considered policy of
50Secretary Forrestal for the "slow progress" under the 19^7 organization.
If the Hoover Commission had considered the nature of conflicts they might
have reached other conclusions. The First Hoover Commission was composed of
dedicated men with broad experiential backgrounds. But they approached the
executive branch with different objectives, viewed it on one small facet
—
organization—and then declared that Forrestal* s policy had produced "slow
progress." They then proposed their solutions. These solutions implied that
organization was the answer and that their over-all solutions would save 3«5
billion dollars and reduce taxes 2 billion dollars. Although many of their
50
Bradley D. Bash, A Hook in Leviathan (Hew York: The Macmillan
Company, 1950), p. 111.
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proposals had been accepted, the Second Hoover Commission found the Government
in "had shape."51
The trend toward centralization in the Defense Department has continu-
ed since 19^7, with central administration and management slowly crystallizing
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This centralization of power, in
the writer's opinion, has both advantages and limitations. These are clearly
the advantages and limitations of centralization versus decentralization and
the conflict of objectives inherent in discarding one system for the other.
The advantages of centralized administration are:
1. Lower expense due to the use of less-skilled personnel
in subordinate positions
2. Widespread application of the unusual skills of top
management
3. Begulation of quality, service, etc., through strict
directives . 52
Decentralization through delegated authority has the following
advantages
:
1. Belief of senior executives from time-consuming
details
2. Increased flexibility due to decision making without
waiting for approval
3. Greater interest and enthusiasm by lower levels be-
cause increased authority and responsibility yield
more pride of accomplishment
k. Development of juniors for promotion to positions
of higher authority. 53
51J James W. Pessler, "Hoover Commission Reports," American Political
Science Review , March, 1957* P» 153
•
-William H. Newman, Administrative Action (New York: Prentice-Hall,




2he 195<3 Reorganization Act, while a centralizing vehicle, wisely
did not accomplish the unification tinder a Chief of Staff, as the Army and
sane members of the Hoover Commission desired. Instead, a centralized-policy
—deeentrallzed-operatioa3 system allows the Secretary of Defense to control
unified cogrnnanita in a decentralised manner through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the same time, through the Secretaries of the Departments, managerial con-
trol (policy) is centralized. Centralization of such control takes away much
of the discretion, once in the hands of the civilian Secretaries, for it
allows the Secretary of Defense to manipulate the development and assignment
of new weapons, and logistical services as he sees fit. He also can abolish,
transfer, and reassign non-combatant functions, subject to congressional ob-
54jection, within 30 days after notification of Congress.
There are major conflicts in the present organization. It should be
emphasized, however, that the writer does not see the all-powerful disaster
or panacea that the Hoover Commission saw in "organization." She military
man should not be concerned with organization, for organization's sake alone.
She real problem lies in the answer to the questions:
1. What is the law?
and,
2. Within the legal organization, what human actions can work to
advance or deter sound defense?
The advantages of the present system are those of centralization.
The conflicting disadvantages which, in the writer's opinion, will soon appear
more evident, are:
1. Decline in the prestige and freedom to act of the civilian ser-
vice Secretaries. If the Secretary of Defense should desire to dictate
policy along narrow lines, the service Secretaries could be effectively by-
passed. It is a veil recognized concept of centralization that there is
5V S. Public Law 65-599.
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little left to do for the intermediate levels of management, but to pass on
orders from above. 33ms, if the Department of Defense should issue its di-
rectives in a narrow vein, many of the "benefits of civilian control-in-depth
would soon disintegrate.
2. Die management of the military departments would become inflex-
ible. This was Secretary Forrestal's fear. Although such a system might
effect economy by eliminating or by-passing intermediate staffs, this might
be more than offset by the lost motion incurred. Communication lines would
be flooded with reports and directives. Time would be lost waiting for
decisions and approvals. The Office of the Secretary of Defense would expand
in size and complexity.
3* Decline in interest, morale, and enthusiasm by the military
departments as their authority and responsibility diminished.
4. Decline in the management ability and fitness for promotion by
members of the military department. [Decision-making ability improves with
exercise].
These are the obvious conflicts that can be anticipated. The less
visible disadvantages will soon be discussed.
Civilian-Military Relationships
Regardless of what many military men unofficially proclaim, there is
a real value in the civilian-control-in-depth over the military. Although
familiarity may breed contempt in some relationships, the Ifevy has learned to
respect the accomplishments of its civilian Secretaries.
Since the surrender of the Confederate Army, Grant's strategy of
massive force has been employed by the American military. There has been a
tendency to over-staff and get the "best regardless of the cost." Consequent-
ly, we never, during 'World War XI, were able to match Russia or Germany in
what we might call "division-efficiency." This could be defined as number of
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men in uniform divided by the number of divisions in the field. Always, our
service Secretaries have been the proponents of efficiency. Today, instead
of the strategy of Grant, we are faced with a possible situation where we may
be the underdog in industry, productivity, and resources ; and will certainly
be the underdog in manpower. We need to discard the strategy of Grant and
study the strategy of Lee and his lieutenants. Where we lack resources, we
must have resourcefulness; where we lack industry, we must have industrious-
ness; where we lack manpower, we must have cleverness and decisiveness; and
where we lack mass, we must have speed, fire-power, communications, and
maneuverability
.
Civilian Secretaries have long been noted for their constructive
criticism of traditional military methods. Civilians forced the Wavy to use
steam and ironclads, the Army to mechanize, and the separate Services to
recognize technical improvements. Their influence-in-depth has often forced
the Services to open their eyes to the demands of the nation. Also, the less
abrupt transcendency in communications and language from the military mind to
the civilian mind has helped create better understanding. The military and
the people have had fewer conflicting aims.
In most cases, this control has worked well. Unhappily, on few
occasions, the loyalty paid the Secretary has not been returned. After
assurances to Congress that no restrictions would be placed on witnesses in
the "B-36 controversy," Secretary Matthews summarily removed Admiral Denfield
55for his testimony. Such situations lead the military sometimes to adopt a
skeptical attitude toward their Secretaries. Motives are involved in con-
flicts. The civilian Secretary comes and goes while the military man stays
on. The Secretary's tenure is short which causes the military man to fear a
-^Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, "Unification and the Marine Corps," (unpub-
lished paper), p. 158.
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lack of understanding. Once understanding and trust are developed, a highly
effective civilian-military combination develops. The "Military-partisan"
attitude of the military man may conflict with the "administration" attitude
of the Secretary. However, if the military man is assured that the Secretary
is doing his best for the Country and the Service, these conflicts, unless
extremely severe, should not deter an effective working relationship*
Other Control Conflicts
The restriction of initiative that might result from too much cen-
tralization would he a hard burden to bear. Possibly the operating forces
could be partially protected from deterioration by their respective depart-
ments, but it is difficult to see how it could be coamjletely absorbed. Just
because an organisation is in a "unified command" does not mean that the
commander would not be restricted in his managerial actions. Nor does it
mean that he would not be faced with voluminous reporting and requesting
chores.
Already governmental restrictions severely limit the managerial
initiative of the military. To cite only a few restrictions, the military
man is strictly controlled in:
1. One classification of civilian personnel
2. She qualifications of civilian personnel
3* The ratings and his ability to promote civilian
personnel
k. His ability to suspend or dismiss civilian
personnel
5. The accounting system he may use
6. An auditing system that passes ex post facto
Judgment on his decisions




8. Restrictive mobilization factors relating to con-
tract placement
9. White House and congressional inquiry influences
10. The interest of the press in sensational Service




Perhaps the safest prevention of the strong military influence, so
feared "by the founding fathers, is the separation of Services and the over-
sight of Congress. Some years ago the Marine Corps fought its fight for sur-
vival. There was unmistakable evidence that without ample congressional pro-
tection that Service would have been quickly decimated.
Congress and the President have often been irritated by inter-service
conflicts. Like all other conflicts the relative merits of each proponent
are hard to judge. Only the test of time and the merits of the arguments
are valid. But one inportant and valuable attribute of conflict, in the
writer* s opinion, is that Just as evolution causes conflict so conflict
brings on evolution. For instance, out of the 19^7 conflict came not uni-
fication—which was the stated purpose—but clarification of the duties of
the military departments, better coordination, better staff advice to the
President, and a greater degree of executive control.
Then with the tightening of the purse strings came the B-36" contro-
versy. This was an extremely rough storm, both within and without the Service
From that controversy came the permission for the departments to undertake some
separate weapons development.
56
* Elmer B. Staats, comments at panel discussion at The George
Washington University, Washington, D. C, April 27, i960.
5701 Sulzberger, op. cit .
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Some of the never weapons of today grow out of tills permission. The
question of supreme importance today is: Will single control of weapons
development by the Secretary of Defense allow sufficient initiative within
the Services? We cannot survive a decade of orthodoxy.
Time proved that the controversy had beneficial results. I leave it
to the reader to picture the Korean situation as we might have entered it
without a 1'Jarine Corps and with no naval aviation.
The separation of the Air Force from the Army had different effects.
Air power emerged in its proper perspective, hut the lack of adequate ground
support aviation techniques and airlift capabilities by the Air Force has
left the Army uncovered and immobile. Perhaps the unified command system will
call attention to such crying needs and foster a more cooperative spirit be*
tween forces as they begin to realize their interdependency in the working
situation. It has been said that inter-service rivalries exist only in
Washington. The direct chain of ffonrnanrl from Washington to the unified com-
mand may augment inter-service cooperation.
The Basic Issues of Inter-Service
or Extra-Service Conflicts
But should conflict reach such an extreme that it must be aired out-
side the Defense Department and the Services, is this bad? Is it wrong for
dedicated men to disagree or to speak out against what they consider a danger
to the Nation's existence? One would think it is not; yet the problem is deep
and complex. These things must be considered;
What are the dissenter's motives?
Consider "Billy"Mitchell. A maverick from the beginning, he pro-
claimed that an independent air arm was equally as efficient yet a cheaper




substitute for the Bavy. He invited court martial and, although "losing the
battle, he von the war."
Wartime and post-yar Air Force budgets have proven Mitchell's economy
arguments false. Boshing surveys have seriously questioned the efficiency
argumeut. inhere is sons evidence that Mitchell may have done more to retard
the emergence of the Air force as a mature arm with a "balanced doctrine. 2he
Army Air Force entered World War II with Mitchell's doctrine of "ignore the
hostile army - destroy the vital centers." If we can believe the bombing
surveys, we find that this theory proved to be an expensive and relatively
ineffective project. (The Ground soldier, the Savy, the tank, and the tacti-
cal aircraft defeated the enemy. Mitchell's doctrine, however, was resur-
rected in the eyes of the public, with the dropping of two atom bombs over
Mitchell's doctrine survives as we enter the missile age. It is now
necessary as a deterrent to war because of its unbridled savagery. Whether
it will be used on a future battlefield is a grave question.
What initiated the dissent?
59
Consider General MacArtkur. In Korea he correctly stated that a
"new war" had opened when the Chinese hordes plunged across the Yalu River.
He demanded authority to bomb the Yalu bridges anfl was refused* He launched
an offensive and was defeated* Whether the bombing of the Yalu bridges
would have prevented this defeat will never be known. But MacArthur could
not admit defeat in the field, so he placed the responsibility on his Com-
mander-in-Chief • His return, after his relief, resembled a triumph. Imagin-
ation allows us to picture the reception he would have received had he in-





What results do the dissenters achieve?
Without doubt the badly needed reorganization of the Defense Depart-
ment came about in the form of "coordination" rather than "unification"
through dissent on the part of the Navy. Possibly dissenters will be needed
in the future to deter the seemingly unavoidable concentration of power in the
Defense Department, should such concentration unduly restrict the Services in
the accomplishment of their missions.
Conflicts today are centered around missions and means ; this seems to
be an ever-recurring point of argument. The nuclear submarine, the space
prograa, and the missile responsibility programs were born out of dissent that
became public.
Granting that organizations must be efficient, it does not follow that
a defense organization is in the business of "saving money." Defense is the
business of a Defense Department. One of the most pressing arguments for
reorganization advanced by the Hoover Commission was that reorganization
would "save money." This is well and good, but a defense structure that
saves money, but deteriorates from within, means a loss of the Country, if
it cannot meet the test of combat.
A centralized organization is probably the most economical, but is it
the best? The manner in which delegation is handled in such an organization
determines long-run success. The present structure can be a vehicle for
either success or misery for the military man, depending on the man in contiol.
To aid his actions and direct him with sound policy, the military man
looks to his civilian Secretary. Together they can form a smooth transition
from government direction to military action.
Freedom of decision is quite limited today for the military manager.
He cannot exercise the amount of control necessary in supervising civilian
personnel, his accounting system is strictly defined. Standardization, in
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many jitters, faces him daily, while political and public pressures in-
'o
fluence his actions.
Within the Defense Department, despite restrictive measures sometimes
applied "by superiors, conflicts "between Services boil to the top. When they
become public, changes are assuredly in the making, quite possibly for the
better. Time and the public will judge the issue.
Organizations are people— conflicts involve people. Organizations
do not conflict with each other, but the people within them do. Organiza-
tions are not usually the cause of conflict. !Ehe actions of people who con-






Before the "beginning of years
There came to the rule of the State
Men with a pair of shears,
Men with an Estimate
—
And fashioned with pens and paper
And fashioned in "black and white,
With Life for a flickering taper
And Death for a blazing light,
The Armed and the Civil power
That they might endure for a span
The much administered man.6l
The Military Mind
Foremost in the minds of the well trained military man is the "big
"M"—the Mission. "What is my Job?" he asks. He then studies the situation
and the courses of action. While doing this he analyzes the special consid-
erations affecting the possible courses, the enemy situation, and his alter-
natives. Analyzing the opposing courses of action, he compares the alterna-
62
tives and makes a decision. Any plan, to obtain maximum effectiveness,
to the military man must minimize the uncertainties.
The Uncertainty of Future War
A perplexing problem, constantly facing the military man is a lack
of essential information. Both the United States and Russia are building
TCipling, "The Masque of Plenty," loc. cit .
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and improving vast stockpiles of weapons, which conceivably neither will use.
So, as Dr. Robert Qppenheimer phrased it, we are "like two scorpions in a
battle." We each have the capability of destroying the other with the
knowledge that before our poison takes effect we will receive a lethal dose
ourselves
.
If we will not fight a nuclear war, then what? We have invented
phrases such as "brush fires." We did not use nuclear weapons in Korea, but
there is certainly some doubt whether that campaign could be called a "brush
fire."
The military man must plan for all possible enemy capabilities. What
are his own resources? This is a perplexing problem. Only at the time his
appropriation bill leaves Congress can the military man estimate to what
6k
extent he can finance his planning. Even then he must face the possibility
of a conflict between the President and Congress with resultant impounding of
funds originally destined for his department. The military man has learned
to live with the uncertainties surrounding an enemy. The uncertainties of
his own position create an anxiety that his training makes doubly difficult
to bear.
Inter-Service Conflicts and the Budget Process
The uncertainty of his own position often causes the military man to
wonder from which point his financing will be attacked. The fact that the
budget will be sliced between the separate military departments naturally
results in some competition between programs. This may lead one department
to publicize the importance of its projects. Conflicting projects, in the
financial sense, often cause a department to compare the values of its
project to the values of another department's project. Sometimes this is
^Millis, loc. cit .
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Staats, loc. cit .
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similar to comparing apples and oranges. It also appears that alarming
statements regarding the inadequate strength of a particular Service often
reach peak intensity as budget time approaches.
Executive-Military Differences
The Service Secretary or military chief of a Service is in a delicate
area if he feels the President's program does not adequately support the mis-
sion assigned his Service. He is faced with weighing his conception of what
is essential to the defense of his country against the consequences to his
Service and himself, should he publicly express his opinion.
65
Loyalty Conflicts
The military officer need look no further than his commission to know
that he is subject to the directives of the President and his superiors. He
has sworn also to uphold the Constitution and defend his country from its
enemies. The ultimate question facing the military man appearing before a
congressional appropriations committee is: "To what extent can I express my
disagreement with Presidential Policy?"
In this situation, the military officer is torn between conflicting
loyalties. He is loyal to the President. He has his own conception of
military needs. He also knows that the Constitution gives Congress the res-
ponsibility of providing for the common defense and raising and supporting
the Army and Navy. Herein lies the conflict. As a member of an executive
department he is legally bound to support the President's programs and
policies but, as a professional military man, is it not his duty to advise and
inform Congress, should advice and information be requested?
Congress is aware of the difficulties faced by the military officer.
Hy examining testimony it is difficult to believe that appropriation
65
^Lowell, op. cit ., chap, xii,

subcommittee members could ask such pointed questions in such a tactful man-
ner if they were not veil aware of the forthcoming answers. In 19*4-9 the
chief of the Senate Committee told General Bradley:
I am not suggesting that you ask for more money, but I am sug-
gesting that if you think you should have more money, if you will
give some of the members a little tip, we will open the door for
you to make such requests as we think you ought to make.
Another favorite door opener is: "Do your budget figures represent
what you originally asked for?" This gives the military officer the opportu-
nity to explain his original request without publicly stating that he dis-
agrees with the final request. He can then be asked what prompted his
original request and why it was reduced. For example:
Senator Chavez* I know that the committee is deeply interested
in all branches of the military services. They are all doing a
good job.
I also know that the committee as a whole feels that if there
is anyone we cannot afford to be austere with, it is the Marine
Corps.
Strength Provision in 1959 Bill
In the matter of personnel, repeating the history of the 1959
appropriation bill, we provided for 200,000 marines; is that not
correct?
General Pate. You did; yes, sir.
Senator Chavez. And it was so stated in the appropriation
bill itself?
General Pate. That is correct*
Senator Chavez. You were not able to utilize fully 200,0002
General Pate. Ko, sir*
Senator Chavez* They cut you down to 163,000; is that
correct?
General Pate. Yes, sir; and then on down to 175*000.
Senator Chavez. I presume that you are acquainted with the
action of this committee and also the action taken on the Senate
floor with reference to this particular matter in the supplemental
bill?
General Pate. Yes, sir.
Senator Chavez. The idea of the floor action on the supple-
mental bill is to let the Pentagon know that it was the intent of
the Senate at least that it should be kept at 200,000 and that we
disliked any kind of excuses that were made about it.
How, tell us, yourself, you could use 200,000:
General Pate. Definitely; yes, sir*

kl
Senator Chavez. What was your request when you originally pre-
pared the "budget?
General Pate. My original request was for 200,000 for the fis-
cal year.
Senator Chavez. Like any other marine you will take what you
can get?
General Pate. Yes, sir; glad to get it.
Senator Chavez. But you would like 200,000?
General Pate. Yes, sir.
Senator Chavez. Do you think we should worry about budget mat-
ters when the world is in the condition it is and cutting down the
Marines by 25,000 men, when every day they are preaching to us that
something is likely to happen momentarily? Do you think that the
only consideration should be "budgetary, or should we think about
what they say we should right now, considering the conditions in the
world?
General Pate. I think the whole thing should be looked at very
carefully, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chavez. Yes, I feel budget considerations are essential
and necessary. I, for one, do not think they should be considered to
the sacrifice of our national security.
You do not have to answer. I think I know how the Marines feel
about it. 66"
Resolving Loyalties
!Kie military officer, faced with a conflict between his loyalty to
the President, his conception of military needs, and his knowledge of con-
gressional responsibilities, must make a personal decision.
1. He is legally and duty-bound to support the President's budget.
2. He must realize the limitations of his own concepts evaluating them
against the sources of information and the opinions of other experts.
3. He must realize that others, especially the President, may have
access to more information.
h. However, he is also bound legally and duty-bound to give Congress
the information necessary to proper legislation. There is a fine point of
law here as to what constitutes executive privilege. This point has never
been completely tested.
U«S. Senate Hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for i960 .
(Washington, D. C. : U.sT Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 16k.
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5. In giving the answers to Congress, absolute honesty is essential.
Facts should be reported as facts} opinions, if requested, should be reported
as such.
She Fine Gray Line
The matter of opinion is the shadowy area. Many of our defense expen-
ditures lie in this area. The fact that strategic bombing during World War II
produced indecisive results did not stop the expenditure of billions of dol-
lars for strategic aircraft to date. If such expenditures provided an effec-
tive deterrent, they were eheap, and would have been so at twice the price.
But one of the bitterest inter-service clashes—the B-36 controversy—was a
war of opinions, fought on a shadowy battleground by men with differences of
opinion and the resolve to make their differences known.
Frankly, and perhaps rightly so, dissent in this gray area, by the
military man, involves the risk of loss of status and the nation's confidence.
The risks are so great that only men of extreme conviction and dedication or
else bold fanaticism dare speak. Legally, if the dissent is contrary to the
President's program, the dissenter is out of bounds. Ethically, it is a gray
area; concerning truth, the only test is the future.
The balance of risks only prompts military men, willing to accept
such risks, to speak out when they feel the situation, or a proposed course
of action, intolerable. They can be assured of the consideration and judgment
of Congress. This consideration is mixed with skepticism, tolerance, and a
desire to learn the truth. Congress is well aware of the risks involved.
They realize that the executive budget is based on many Presidential consid-
erations; they also realize their own duty to the people.
Fortunately the language of those who dissent is couched in tact,
propriety, and diplomacy. For example:

k3
Senator Chavez. May I ask if you have similar reservations as
of nov as the Army had yesterday?
General Pate. I have reservations.
I am not sure they correspond exactly with the Army. I am
prepared to give you my reservations.
Senator Chavez. Are you prepared to give your reservations
for the record? g~
General Pate. I am, sir.
Policy Conflicts
Administration policies can cause conflicts to come about within the
executive "branch. For example: the present administration is committed to
a fight against inflation. From a 19^-7-19^9 "base, the industrial price index
has risen from 113.80 in 1952 to 128.5$ in October of 1959. Even the Presi-
dent does not deny that there has been a steady increase, but he says that it
must stop. If the military departments allow for future inflation and in
his requested dollars, are they not, as a member of executive departments,
admitting defeat? Are they not helping defeat an executive policy? On the
other hand, if a certain amount of inflation is inevitable, are they not re-
miss in their duties if they fail to provide for it? !33ae word "inflation" is
conspicuous due to its absence from military testimony before the appropria-
tion subcommittees in recent years.
Unofficially, military men state today's inflation problem real-
istically, calling it "level-funding" (the same budget, year after year, with
slow attrition of buying power due to inflation). Another term, practically
synonymous, is "limited dollars."
Belations with Congress
The military officer, testifying before Congress, usually has a pro-
posed budget which he considers insufficient. For example:
Ibid*.* P- lQ6 -
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You may blame the War Department for a gi-eat many things. They
have made their mistakes and sometimes bitter mistakes, but you can-
not blame us for not asking for money. That is one fault to which
we plead not guilty.""
Usually, when appearing before Congress, there is no Immediate con-
flict. The military officer's disagreements lie farther back in the process
—
with the Department of Defense or the Budget Bureau. If this is the case, he
looks to Congress as a possible means of getting more money. On the other
hand, if Congress is disposed to trim the budget, there is conflict, but there
is little recourse, except to be equipped with the best possible justifica-
tion. Congress is the ultimate authority. If the House trims the budget, the
military officer may go to the Senate with a reclama, attempting restoration
of all or a part of the amount cut. In this case, the Senate acts in an
appelate capacity. The military man usually admits defeat in the minor pro-
grams, reserving only those items considered absolutely essential for reclama.
Conflicts with the Bureau of the Budget
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 established the Bureau of the
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Budget as a civilian staff agency of the President. The law charged the
President with the responsibility of preparing the budget and presenting it to
Congress annually. To do this it was recognized that a competent staff was
essential. It took some time for the Bureau to gain the control that it has
today. Once budgeting consisted of presenting a "book of estimates" to Con-
gress. These estimates more often represented "wants" than "needs". Today,
expert estimators review each item of the budget submitted by the departments.
Wot only does the Bureau work with budgeting, but it has other functions, one
of the more important being to act as a legislative clearing house. As such,
it interprets and passes on "Presidential Policy" toward proposed legislation.
6fl
^General Douglas MacArthur, testifying at 1935 Senate Hearings,
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There is no question regarding the success of the Budget Bureau in
its operation. But this does not mean that success is achieved "by popularity.
A major area of conflict centers around the question of overlapping authority.
For instance: If the Secretary of Defense considers a certain program indis-
pensable to the Defense Department, should his policy be rendered useless
through the refusal of the Budget Bureau to x-euuest sufficient funding? She
Budget Bureau is hasty to declare that it doe3 not control military policy,
but its close identification to "Presidential Policy," together with the fact
that its directives are issued in the shadow of the President, tend to weaken
the foundation of that argument, m actuality, arbitrary ceilings have been
proposed and the Budget Bureau has held to them. Who can say that this does
not control military policy? When the 195$ Budget was being prepared,
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Treasury Secretary Humphrey touched off a major budget controversy. He
was perplexed because the expected surplus and tax cut did not come about.
Military spending was going up and total spending broke through the "sonic"
$70 billion barrier on the way up. Secretary of Defense Wilson was told by
Budget Director Brundage to trim his budget from $40 billion to $36 billion.
Mr. Wilson came down to $38 • 5 billion and refused to budge. This conflict "Has
resolved by the President; Mr. Wilson won. This conflict disclosed wide
areas of disagreement within the executive branch. As pointed out before,
conflicts usually help to locate areas which aeed improvement. In this
case, since the President eventually upheld Mr. Wilson, it appears that a
clearer line of communication was required between the President and the
Secretary of Defense on budget matters. Another point seems to be that the
Budget Director was making decisions affecting military policy beyond his
authority. The fact that the President, at his first news conference where
the budget was mentioned, appeared to disclaim responsibility revealed that
July, 1957.
70Charles J. V. Murphy, "The Budget and Eisenhower," Fortune,
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possibly the Budget Director was not keeping the President informed of dif-
ferences "but was relying on his own status, "in the President's shadow," to
resolve conflicts.
This example serves to illustrate the prime conflict "between the
Budget Bureau and the military. "When budget hearings are held, an estimator
has to arrive at a dollar figure which will go into the President's "budget.
If the dollar figure is below what the department head considers essential,
the estimator is accused of dictating military policy through the budget.
The estimator accuses the military man of attempting to disrupt the national
economy to advance his own special interest, when these conflicts arise, the
estimator will win every time, unless the issue goes to the President for
reconciliation. The Budget Bureau has the authority to whittle where it
desires. It takes little imagination to visualize the frustration felt "by the
military man who knows that hundreds of little battles are lost before a big
one can "be won by the Secretary of Defense appealing to the President.
This is not all as "bad as it might appear. The intention of this
paper is to point out conflicts, but it would "be unfair to declare the system
invalid simply because conflicts exist. The present budgeting system has many
advantages. It results in a budget better aligned with the national economy.
The estimators without exception are men who have not only the best interests
of the nation at heart but also the military. An estimator in continual con-
flict would not last too long. The hearings are often held in conjunction
with the departments own hearings which allow the estimator to get a good
over-all view of the problems involved. But quite frequently conflicts do
come about and the balance of power is consistently on the side of the
estimator.
It is fortunate, then, that the military man gets a further chance
to speak out. Before Congress, if asked the proper questions, he can state
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his points of difference. Bat, as mentioned before, he must keep the
quantity of differences to a minimum in order to maximize their importance
and not be accused of "crying volf." So the big battles are fought before
the President and before Congress. The military man will usually concede the
small ones in order to maintain his strength to win the larger issues.
Conclusion
Most military men are trained to know their own position and find out
as much as possible about the enemy. It seems logical for them to face the
uncertainties of planning the defense of the liation against whatever forces
it may meet. However, it is frustrating to be constantly faced with the in-
ternal uncertainty as to whether their well-laid plans will be financed.
Because of this internal uncertainty, the military man is prepared to defend
himself against any force which might deter his plans. The force may be a
sister Service, in which case he is prepared to engage in inter-service con-
flicts to prevent his position from being undercut.
Hot only will the military man defend himself against internal con-
flicts, but he often finds himself in disagreement with the President or his
appointed agents from the Budget Bureau. The decision to disagree openly is
a weighty one, since it can quickly become a personal issue reflecting on
the loyalty of the dissenter. Congress, the ultimate authority, is quick to
sense conflict, and in many cases allows the matter to be discussed in such
a way that it may be smoothly handled. This gieatly minimizes the personal
danger and resolves the conflicts in a tactful manner.
The military man is hampered by being required to accept policies,
such as inflation control, which he may not believe effective. In this case
he may hide the effects of inflation in the effects of other factors, such
as obsolescence.

The system of "budgeting "brings the Military man face to face with
the Budget Bureau, against whom he is virtually powerless, except by appeal
to the President or Congress. Because the appeal instrument becomes ineffec-
tive through frequent use, it is exercised only on the most important issues.
Ebis, then, is the battle of the Budget. It results in an amount of
money to be spent. It is the direct battle. Each year the military man wins






It is now time to skeletonize some of the current conflicts in a
critical light. Dedicated men should continually examine the issues facing
them in order to maximize the good results that may come out of conflicts,
and minimize the unnecessary conflicts deterring good government.
Faults of Narrow Appraisal
Much of the control of government departments, many of the criticisms
thrown at government departments, and many of the conflicts arising out of
important issues, are based on improper examination. Too often the whole is
Judged by one or a minority of its parts. It is extremely immature to live
71in a world of isolated particulars when the real world consists of wholes*
'
Yet this sort of immaturity is seen daily in government. A recent article by
72Congressman Kowalski, advocating the abolishment of the separate nervices,
used Just such faulty logic. Only a few years before, Colonel Kowalski
taught the fallacies of exercising such Immature Judgments to Army officers!
Recently the Air Force was criticized because one of its manuals contained
some questionable material regarding communism in churches and the right of
the press to certain military information. The result was a new system of
reviewing publications at a higher level. A mature viewpoint would have been
' H. A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind (ffew York: W. W. Norton Company,
Inc., 19^9).
'T'rank Kowalski, 'Why We Mast Abolish the Army, Navy, and Air Force,"




to take such action necessary to correct the isolated circumstance. General
wide-sweeping changes are indicated only when a better method Is patently more
efficient and less expensive. Perhaps this was the case. Sometimes an iso-
lated particular can reveal a major deficiency in a large structure, hut few
buildings are ever condemned because a crack appears in a plaster wall, numer-
ous and everwidening cracks are a different matter.
Shall We Judge Men Or Paper?
Men exist in the flesh. Organizations exist on paper. Man's concept
of the organisation and his responsibilities therein determine his and the
organization's effectiveness. Once an organization chart is drawn up it stays
in the same form until revised. Men flow in and out of an organization and
its surroundings. It is on this flow of mankind that the major judgment should
fall, not on the paper structure through which they flow.
Yet the Government is paradoxically delicate in handling men. Too
often is a Presidential commission, such as the Hoover Commission, prone to
surrogate the responsibilities for poor results. Organizations and procedures
are blamed for the poor results .achieved by men and the methods of men. l* Too
often does an isolated case of mismanagement or a tragic accident result in
widesweeping organization changes. Too seldom do governmental commissions
place the blame for poor management on a poor manager.
The Evaluation of Organization
If men are more important than paper organization, why then all this
criticism of organization? Some criticism is valid. Some of the more valid
criticisms are:
1. The organization is not task-organized to accomplish the objectives





2. The organization does not designate responsibility.
3* The organization does not provide those responsible with the
necessary tools with which to do their job.
4. The organization hinders lateral and horizontal comraunication.
5. The organization divides over-all responsibility for the same
function.
6. The organization does not take advantage of economy and efficiency
7. The organization does not catch rewards and punishment with per-
formance.
8. The organization does not foster initiative at supervisory levels.
9. The organization does not develop men capable of assuming leader-
ship*
These are only a few of the causes of ineffective management* Some
can be traced to the actions of men who built the organization* The rest can
be traced to the actions of men within the organization* But the primary
theme in evaluating an organization is: "Does it aid its members to work
effectively? If it is so structured.) (most of them are), and it is still in-
effective, then we must look to the men who control it. Zt is my contention
that more fault can be found in men than in the structure in which men work.
Limitations Imposed on Effectiveness
Behind many conflicts, particularly the civilian-military conflicts,
is the frustration inherent in a situation where a manager does not have the
tools properly to perform his Job. These limitations are especially discon-
certing if they prevent a manager from being able to control his personnel.
FOr example, Government service is based on a reward-and-punishment structure.
However, rewards and punishments are not properly correlated with performance
and behavior. A recent estimate holds that in civil service positions the
probability that the best worker in any sub-unit would be promoted is .60
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while the probability that the worst worker would be suspended or dismissed
is .10.
?if
When a military man is placed in a oide-by-side or superior-subordi-
nate-relationship with a civil servant, the inequality of treatment that must
be accorded different workers does much to limit effectiveness. She military
man knows that his future depends on performance. 2ne civilian knows that
his future is not so closely correlated.
Hot only do limitations exist on performance but on classification,
qualifications and ratings. Others that have been mentioned are the uncer-
tainties of financing operations each year; accounting and measurement systems
which originate outside the organization; and restrictions on space, supplies,
forms, and equipment. All of these governmental limitations, while sometimes
necessary for over-all government efficiency, can be so narrowly defined that
the result is over-all inefficiency. This is particularly true if no con-
sideration is given over-all performance of the organization. As Government
grows it takes men of wide conception to view the whole. It is easier for
men of specialized skills to narrowly appraise particulars. The problem,
then, becomes one of coordinating specialized appraisals to assure that they
fit the whole. Our Government faces this problem today. Sae trend is toward
centralization in the executive branch. As the trend continues, the organiza-
tion expands beyond the limits of human conception. In an attempt to regain
conception, huge staffs are built up. Tb& staffs are composed of specialists
who attempt to examine isolated particulars. Other staffs are built up to
coordinate the particulars and combine them into a whole capable of conception
This quest for information and attempts at proper appraisal can have such
detrimental results ast
7k t




1. The faults of centralization previously mentioned.
2. The necessity of requiring a constant stream of reports flowing
up a communication chain which is constantly constricting-
3. The burden of reporting upon operating units
.
4. The attempt of specialized appraisers to find general rules by
which to measure a number of specific activities.
Many of these limitations have been imposed by businessmen who feel
that the Government should be run on a "business-like" basis. The failure of
so many businessmen who have been placed in positions of government responsi-
bility does not seem to alter their beliefs*
Management of the Defense Department
It is still too early to determine the complete effect of the 195&
Iteorganization on the effectiveness of the military departments. Certain
trends, however, merit watchfullness, and possibly alarm. The most valuable
asset of the Defense Department is its men in uniform. Trends which may
deteriorate the effectiveness of this asset are;
1. A larger staff of specialized information-seekers in the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
2. Circumvention of the department Secretaries in the administrative
frfljfpUT^ <**t*OTi!» chain.
3. Standardization and control to the extent that initiative and
training of executives are impaired.
k. The widespread use of general measurements to specific situations.
5. failure to coordinate instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with those to the military department Secretaries.
6. A tendency to divide responsibility, placing the blame for inef-
fectiveness on organizations, not men.

7. failure to grant consideration to men who disagree within legal
bounds.
8. One attempt to place restrictions upon the thoughts of sen in the
higher responsible positions. Men should not he required to act against what
their experience, conception, and conscience lead them to believe, especially
if the ultimate decision is still to be made. This is particularly true of
testimony before Congress.
9. !Ehe requirement for information for information's sake alone.
Vast files of information and numerous reports not essential to management can
result if an organization is too responsive to congressional control. 2his
not only hampers the effectiveness of operating agencies but deteriorates the
position of the executive branch.
Budgeting
In the Bureau of the Budget can be found the most concentrated group
of specialists vho attempt through examination of particulars to concentrate
these into a conceivable whole. Here, perhaps, is the most striking case of
an attempt to apply a general rule to many specific unrelated functions.
Most of the conflicts between the Budget Bureau and the military lie
in the divergence of objectives, the limits of conception and the measure-
ments applied. For instance, consider a project such as warehousing. Shis
is important to the entire operation of a military department. Statistical
work measurement for budget back-up purposes measures cost-per-ton-moved. De-
pending on the item moved (heavy tank versus toilet paper, for example) the
costs may vary from $1.00 to $30.00 per ton. -2he Budget Bureau attempts to
apply a general measure (perhaps $5.00 per programmed ton) to evaluate the
budget request. Because of the failure of measurement methods, a weak link
may be built into a highly dependent chain.
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The failure of the Budget Bureau to recognize the future effects of
inflation and the establishment of advance dollar limitations tend to create
an artificial atmosphere* The military man, like Tommy, is "no bloomin' fool."
He knows that his budget is limited today "by the amount he received the pre-
vious year. He knows that an increase to account for future inflation or
additional operational missions must be Justified by deception and concealment
The Budget reviewer knows that this is taking place so he attempts to find
where he is being deceived and what is being hid. In a process where honesty
and forthrightness should reign supreme it seems strange that dishonesty and
cleverness are so often applied.
aecnmmervlfttions for Improvement
In order to remove restrictions which create conflict, the following
areas could well be examined:
1. The possibility of aligning civilian rewards and punishments to
more closely approximate performance.
2. A requirement that the performance of men be Judged before enforc-
ing organisational changes*
3* The possibility of refusal, by the executive branch, to give
Congress information which is not related to effective management, congres-
sional oversight, or proposed legislation.
k. A study of the effectiveness of general appraisal and measuring
techniques when applied to specific situations.
5* Elimination of limitations which remove tools from the hands of
6. A general written agreement between the executive and legislative




7* An attempt to replace honesty in the budget process. Possibly the
project manager concept, such as used in weapons systems, could be used. In
this manner, a dollar limit could be given specific managers along with a
letter of instructions. After-the-fact study of performance within the limita-
tion would not only determine the next limitation, but the effectiveness of
8. Utilizing more effective communication.
9* Education in conception on the part of specialists.
10. If mechanization forces centralized record-keeping, new methods
of interrogating electronic machines must be devised. E&is will eliminate
reporting on Information stored elsewhere.
Conclusion
Congress and the executive branch are constantly frustrated in their
attempts to achieve efficient and effective government. Much of this frustra-
tion can be blamed on their inability to accept responsibility for their
actions and to hold other executives responsible for their performance. Many
of the limitations imposed on managers are thwarting good management. She
limitations on personnel action, for example, tend more to protect the
mediocre and inefficient than to advance the excellent worker. 2he security
of misfits seems more important than the security of the nation.
Siere are many areas where a reappraisal of the value of present
techniques could prove worthwhile. Foremost among these are Defense Depart-
ment Organization and Management, and the Budget Process. There is need for
a more honest and forthright approach in government processes. Snare is need
for face to face appraisal of the performance of men. In spite of the restric-
tions under which they work, many dedicated men in Government apply these
principles successfully. 2hat they accept frustrating conditions, learning
noieyloaoO
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to work with and use them, is remarkable. 2hat they should be required to do
so In an annually increasing amount Is disgraceful. 2nis is especially true




The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each tooth-point goes
The butterfly upon the road _-
Preaches contentment to that toad. '
^
Our Government is a huge and complex zaachine. It is growing yearly.
As it grows the conflicting aims and desires of the public grow in intensity.
As these partisan forces weld themselves into stronger pressure groups, the
Congress makes more demands , both formally by legislation and informally
through investigation and oversight, upon the executive branch. The execu-
tive branch must cooperate with reasonable demannis and resist other flftmanflft
nonessential to management, oversight and legislation,
The need for closer cooperation, together with the need for reasonable
resistance, requires men of broad conceptual skills, well versed in the in-
tricacies of government. The attempts to find these men in the world of
business have often been singularly unsuccessful.
Since the times require men who possess the experience and knowledge
necessary to judge the instance in which they should be pliable to the will
of Congress, and the instance at which they should stand firm, there is a need
for tools. The tools required are those which a responsible man can use,
enabling Qovernment to hold him responsible for his actions.




More and more the military man finds himself holding greater respon-
sibilities. As he is thrust more "before the public judgment and his opinions
became more important, there is a need for making his job easier.
The military man is not afraid of responsibility, nor is he afraid of
the uncertainty of an enemy situation. However, increasing uncertainty re-
garding his own situation is a difficult cross to bear. The imposition of
restrictions to his actions, together with increasing operational missions,
make his duties doubly onerous.
The military man is willing to assume responsibility* in greater
quantities. He is willing to lead or be led. He will always do more than
his fair share.
Honesty, forthrightness and dedication to duty are in the highest
military tradition. It is unfair and intolerable to the military man to be
placed in positions where he may be chastised for possessing these qualities.
The military man does not want to be a politician. The framers of the
Constitution realized the danger of interjecting any influence of the military
into politics. Today military expenditures so influence the economy of the
Ifetion that the use of the military budget as a political tool is highly
tempting to politicians. The extreme danger in such a design is readily
apparent. Also apparent is the danger in using the defense organization as
a "money saving" tool. Efficiency of management is a more acceptable term.
"Saving" implies previously legislated waste.
We should be more attentive to governmental conflicts. These con-
flicts should be judged by their quality and the motives of the antagonists.
Conflicts, which indicate a need for change, should be followed by action.
Not all conflicts, however, require general correction. There is danger in
applying extensive defensive measures against disagreements.
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One of the "best ways to eliminate conflicts is "by exercise of con-
ceptual skills and by cfimraml cations. Military sen* in the years ahead, oust
seek a broader understanding of their positions in the government processes.
To the extent that they place their loyalties in the proper perspective, they
vill find themselves seldom engaged in conflict. $o the extent that they do
not attempt to engage in political matters, resisting the encroachment of
politics into military affairs, they vill maintain the respect of the Nation.
To the extent that they protect the right to be held responsible for their
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